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Abstract
Psychophysical and neurophysiological studies have suggested that memory is not simply a carbon copy of our experience:
Memories are modified or new memories are formed depending on the dynamic structure of our experience, and
specifically, on how gradually or abruptly the world changes. We present a statistical theory of memory formation in a
dynamic environment, based on a nonparametric generalization of the switching Kalman filter. We show that this theory
can qualitatively account for several psychophysical and neural phenomena, and present results of a new visual memory
experiment aimed at testing the theory directly. Our experimental findings suggest that humans can use temporal
discontinuities in the structure of the environment to determine when to form new memory traces. The statistical
perspective we offer provides a coherent account of the conditions under which new experience is integrated into an old
memory versus forming a new memory, and shows that memory formation depends on inferences about the underlying
structure of our experience.
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Introduction
How does the brain take a continuous stream of sensory inputs
and translate it into stored memories? Theorists have offered
radically different answers to this question. According to
biologically inspired theories (e.g., [1–3]), input patterns are
continuously assimilated into a distributed network of intercon-
nected neurons via modification of synaptic connections. When a
network trained in this fashion is allowed to run freely or with
partial input, it will converge to one or more stable configurations–
attractors–corresponding to blends of stored input patterns. This
view of memory asserts that experiences are not stored individ-
ually, but rather overlaid on one another. Many modern
psychological theories of memory (e.g., [4–6]) adopt a diametri-
cally opposed view: Input patterns are stored separately, and
memory blending, if it occurs, happens at retrieval rather than
during storage (though see [7–9] for notable exceptions which
allow memory traces to be modified by multiple input patterns).
One way to approach this question is to consider the
information processing problem being solved by the memory
system. If we were to design a brain, how would it parse
experience into memory traces? This exercise in ‘‘rational
analysis’’ [10] leads us to a statistical formulation of the memory
storage problem. We propose that the memory system is designed
to facilitate optimal predictions under a particular generative
model of the environment. According to this generative model (see
also [11,12]), the environment tends to change slowly over time,
but occasionally jumps between completely different ‘‘modes.’’ For
instance, while the temperature can fluctuate slowly within
different parts of a building, going outside is characterized by
very different (but also slowly changing) temperatures than those
that were in effect indoors. Stored memories then correspond to
inferences about the latent modes (e.g., we can recall the general
temperature inside the building, and separately, the outdoor
temperature), and input patterns are clustered together if they are
inferred to have been generated by the same mode. This theory
retains the idea from the cognitive psychology literature that the
memory system contains multiple traces, but assumes that each
trace may be a blend of several input patterns, as is the case for
many neural network models.
Memories are no doubt stored at many resolutions: while you
might have a general memory of being cold when outside and
warm when inside, you will also probably remember precisely
whether you wore a hat to combat the cold. Following traditional
psychological models, we claim that separate traces for each input
pattern are stored at the finest-grained, most ‘‘episodic’’ resolution.
Layered on top of these episodic separate traces are more general
traces that serve to organize memory retrieval and form
predictions of the future. At this coarser resolution, experience
must be parsed into separate traces or combined into more general
traces. The goal of our theory is to illuminate the laws governing
memory parsing. Depending on the statistical structure of the
environment, this parsing process will produce traces that appear
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more or less ‘‘semantic,’’ in the sense that they aggregate
information over individual episodes [13,14]. In order to avoid
cumbersome terminology, we will henceforth use ‘‘traces’’ to refer
to those traces formed as the result of parsing at the coarser-
grained resolution of memory.
We tested our theory using a novel behavioral task that allows us
to assess qualitatively whether participants store different stimuli in
one or several memory traces. We presented dynamically
changing visual stimuli to participants, and subsequently asked
them to reconstruct one of the previously presented stimuli from
memory. When the stimuli changed gradually, the reconstructions
suggested that participants had, to some extent, inferred a single
dynamical mode and thus formed one memory trace in which
different instances interfered with each other. In contrast, when
the stimuli changed abruptly, participants’ behavior suggested that
they had inferred two dynamical modes, one before the abrupt
change and one after. This resulted in less interference between
stimuli experienced before and after the change, and reconstruc-
tion of stimuli presented before the change was more accurate.
Background
Recent psychophysical studies have explored the dynamics of
memory updating by presenting participants with sequences of
stimuli and then probing their ability to discriminate between
different stimuli in the sequence. The logic of these studies is that if
the stimuli are assimilated into the same dynamical mode, then
they will be perceived as being more similar, compared to a
situation where they are segmented into different modes. For
example, Wallis and Bu¨lthoff [15] presented participants with a
rotating face that gradually morphed into a different face.
Compared to a condition in which the morphs were presented
in a mixed (scrambled) order, participants in the gradual morph
condition were more prone to perceive the final face as belonging
to the same person as the original face. Similar findings were
reported by Preminger and colleagues [16,17] using a variety of
memory tests.
These psychophysical observations are complemented by neuro-
physiological studies of spatial representation in the rodent
hippocampus. Many neurons in the CA3 subfield of the
hippocampus respond selectively when the animal is in a particular
region of space, and are therefore known as ‘‘place cells’’ [18]. We
can apply the same logic used in the aforementioned psychophysical
studies to the hippocampal representation of space [19], asking
whether morphing one environment into another will lead to
gradual changes in place cell firing rate (indicating a gradually
changing spatial memory) or a global remapping of place fields
(indicating the formation of a new memory). Leutgeb et al. [20] and
Wills et al. [21] had rats explore a set of enclosures whose shape
varied from a square to a circle (including intermediate shapes).
Gradually changing the enclosure shape (the ‘‘gradual’’ protocol)
resulted in gradual changes in place fields [20], whereas presenting
the same series of enclosures in a scrambled order (the ‘‘mixed’’
protocol) resulted in global remapping – enclosures that were more
similar to the circle than to the square tended to elicit one set of
place fields, and enclosures that were more similar to the square
than to the circle tended to elicit a distinct set of place fields [21]. As
with the psychophysical findings described above, these results
highlight the importance of sequential structure in guiding memory
organization; the same stimuli can elicit very different internal
representations depending on the order in which they are presented.
Using a Hopfield network to encode the input patterns,
Blumenfeld et al. [22] proposed a ‘‘salience-weighted’’ modifica-
tion of the standard Hebbian learning rule to model these findings.
Intuitively, the salience weight encodes a prediction error or
novelty signal that indicates the extent to which none of the
network’s existing attractors match the current input pattern.
Formally, the salience weight is the Hamming distance between
the input pattern and the network state after one step of dynamics;
the salience weight is updated incrementally after each input
pattern so as to smooth across recent history. A large salience
weight promotes the formation of a new attractor based on the
current input. For our purposes, the key idea to take away from
this model is that prediction errors are useful signals for
determining when to infer new memory modes (see also [23–
26]). In the network explored by Blumenfeld et al., a new attractor
is only formed if the prediction error is sufficiently large, but how
large is ‘‘sufficient’’? In the next section, we place these ideas
within a statistical framework, which allows us to specify the
prediction error threshold in terms of probabilistic hypotheses
about the environment.
The statistical framework
The essence of our approach is captured by the following
generic assumption about the environment: Properties of the
environment usually change gradually, but occasionally undergo
‘‘jumps’’ that reflect a new underlying state of affairs [11,12].
Returning to the temperature example, when you walk around
outside, you may experience gradual changes in temperature over
the course of the day. If you step into a building, the temperature
may change abruptly. In predicting what the temperature will be
like in 5 minutes, you might then generalize from one outdoor
location to another, but not between the indoor location and
outdoor locations. Thus, our generalizations depend strongly on
how we segment our observations; cognitively speaking, one can
view each segment as a memory trace that aggregates those
observations assigned to the segment. The empirical data reviewed
in the previous section are consistent with the idea that the brain is
attuned to abrupt changes in the state of the environment.
The problem of estimating the current state of a hidden variable
given previous sensory measurements is known in engineering as
filtering. The classic example of a filtering algorithm is the
Kalman filter (KF; [27]), which is the Bayes-optimal estimator
under the assumption that the environment evolves according to a
linear-Gaussian dynamical system (LDS) –i.e., the state of the
environment changes gradually and noisily over time. By design,
Author Summary
When do we modify old memories, and when do we create
new ones? We suggest that this question can be answered
statistically: The parsing of experience into distinct
memory traces corresponds to inferences about the
underlying structure of the environment. When sensory
data change gradually over time, the brain infers that the
environment has slowly been evolving, and the current
representation of the environment (an existing memory
trace) is updated. In contrast, abrupt changes indicate
transitions between different structures, leading to the
formation of new memories. While these ideas fall
naturally out of statistical models of learning, they have
not yet been directly tested in the domain of human
memory. In this paper, we describe a model of statistical
inference that instantiates these ideas, and test the model
by asking human participants to reconstruct previously
seen visual objects that have since changed gradually or
abruptly. The results of this experiment support our theory
of how the statistical structure of sensory experiences
shapes memory formation.
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this model cannot account for large sporadic jumps and periods of
gradual change between them.
One way to model jumps is to posit a collection of different
‘‘dynamical modes’’, each corresponding to a slowly changing LDS,
and allow the generative process to switch between them
stochastically. This is known as a switching LDS, and its
corresponding Bayes-optimal estimator is the switching KF.
However, for real-world sensory measurements, it is not reasonable
to specify the number of possible modes in advance. We therefore
adopt a Bayesian infinite-capacity (nonparametric) generalization of
the switching LDS based on the Dirichlet process [28], which allows
the number of modes to expand as necessary as measurements are
collected (another dynamical model that could capture jumps within
a single mode is a random walk with a heavy-tailed distribution on
step size, such as a Le´vy flight [29]).
The infinite-capacity prior over modes leads to an intuitive
interpretation in terms of memory traces: Each mode clusters
together a number of individual observations, and thus can be
identified with a temporally extended episodic memory trace such as
the memory of the temperature outside. The number of such modes
is essentially unlimited. However, because in our model small
numbers of modes have higher probability a priori, the result is that
the memory system tries to account for its observations as
parsimoniously as possible by using existing modes to explain
multiple observations. This leads to potential modification of existing
modes each time a new observation is assigned to them, and sporadic
creation of new modes. Below we describe this model formally.
Results
We first propose a normative computational model that can
account for the psychophysical and neural findings discussed in the
Introduction. We then describe a new psychophysical experiment
that tests the predictions of our model.
Generative model
Let st[R
D denote a set of sensory measurements at time t,
arising from unobservable state variables xkt [R
D, where k indexes
modes. For instance, the observation may be the current
temperature, and the state variables are the air pressure, cloud
coverage, inside/outside location, air conditioner, thermostat
status, and many other direct causes of temperature. Let
zt[f1, . . . ,?g denote the mode active at time t. This mode
specifies particular state-space dynamics, for instance, a mode
corresponding to being indoors with the air conditioning on
(which specifies the dependence of temperature on thermostat
settings), another corresponding to air conditioning being off,
another to being outside in the shade, etc.
Our model assumes that measurements (observations) are
generated according to the following stochastic process. For each
time point t:
1. Draw a mode zt from a sticky Chinese restaurant process prior
[30]:
p(zt~kjz1:t{1)~
Nkzbd½zt{1,k
azbzt{1
if k is a previously sampled mode
a
azbzt{1
if k is a new mode,
8><
>:
ð1Þ
where Nk is the number of previous timepoints in which mode
k was drawn, b§0 is a stickiness parameter that governs mode
persistence, and a§0 is a concentration parameter that
specifies the probability of drawing a completely new mode.
When b~0, Eq. 1 generates a partition of trials to modes z1:t
that corresponds to the distribution over partitions induced by
a Dirichlet process [31]. This prior assigns higher probability to
partitions with a small number of dynamical modes, and hence
expresses a ‘‘simplicity principle’’ [32] –all else equal, sensory
data are more likely to be generated by a simpler environment,
comprised of fewer modes. When bw0, modes tend to persist
over multiple consecutive time points, with b controlling the
strength of this persistence.
2. If zt is a new mode, draw the state variable x
zt
t from a Gaussian
base measure: xztt *N (m0,C), where m0 is the prior mean and
C~diag(c1, . . . ,cD) the covariance matrix of the state
variables.
3. Diffuse the state variables for each active mode:
xkt*N (wxkt{1,Q), where w[ 0,1½  is a decay term and
Q~diag(q1, . . . ,qD) is the diffusion noise covariance matrix.
The diagonal terms of Q determine the rate of change: larger
values of qd induce more rapid change along dimension d.
Note that the state variable for a mode (once it is activated for
the first time) evolves even when that mode is no longer active.
4. Emit sensory measurements st from a Gaussian centered on the
state of the currently active mode zt: st*N (xztt ,R), where
R~diag(r1, . . . ,rD) is the sensory noise covariance matrix.
This generative model is a simplification of the nonparametric
switching LDS described in [28].
To summarize the generative model: The hidden state diffuses
gradually until a jump occurs; this jump can be either to a
previously activated mode, or to a new mode (in which case a new
starting point is drawn for that mode, from a Gaussian prior). The
concentration parameter a controls the probability that a new
mode will be activated: Larger values of a result in more modes,
and if a~0, there are no jumps and we obtain a special case of the
standard LDS formulation. The stickiness parameter b encourages
modes to persist over time; when b~0, we recover the original
Chinese restaurant process [33]. The diffusion variances fqdg
control the rate of change within a mode: Larger values of qd
result in faster change. The sensory noise variance rd controls the
informativeness of the observations about the hidden state: As rd
increases, the sensory measurements become noisier and hence
convey less information about the hidden state.
Bayesian inference with an infinite-capacity switching
LDS
Given the generative model, the filtering problem is to infer the
posterior distribution over the state variable xkt for each mode k
given the history of sensory measurements S1:t~fs1, . . . ,stg. This
computation is given by:
p(xkt DS1:t)~
X
z1:t
p(xkt DS1:t,z1:t)p(z1:t)
&
X
zt
p(xkt DS1:t,zt)p(ztDz^1:t{1),
ð2Þ
where z^t~argmaxkp(zt~kDS1:t,z^1:t{1). This corresponds to a
‘‘local’’ approximation [34–36] that maintains only a single high
probability partition z^1:t of previous observations to hidden causes.
This partition is then used to calculate the probability of the
current trial being drawn from each of the latent causes zt~k by
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combining the sticky Chinese restaurant process prior (Eq. 1) and
the likelihood (conditional on the partition and the previous
observations) of the current state vector xkt . Although we could
have used more sophisticated methods (e.g., particle filtering) to
approximate the marginalization, this method works well on the
examples we consider, and is much faster, making it easier to fit to
behavioral data.
We now describe how to compute each of the components in
Eq. 2. The conditional distribution p(xkt DS1:t,zt) is a Gaussian, with
mean x^kt and covariance L
k
t~diag(l
k1
t , . . . ,l
kD
t ), updated accord-
ing to:
x^kdt ~wx^
kd
t{1zg
kd
t (s
d
t{x^
kd
t{1), l
kd
t ~(1{g
kd
t )(w
2lkdt{1zq
d )ð3Þ
for each dimension d, where the estimated mean and variance
for a new mode k are x^k0~m0 and l
k
0~c (respectively) and the step
size (or learning rate) g, also known as the Kalman gain, is
gkdt ~
lkd
t{1
zqd
lkd
t{1
zqdzrd
if zt~k
0 otherwise:
8<
: ð4Þ
Using the local approximation described above, the posterior
over mode assignments is given by:
p(zt~kDS1:t,z^1:t{1)!p(stDS1:t{1,z^1:t{1,zt~k)p(zt~kD^z1:t{1), ð5Þ
where the second term is the prior (Eq. 1), and the first term is
the likelihood:
p(stjS1:t{1,z^1:t{1,zt~k)~
N (st; x^kt ,Lkt{1zQzR) if k is a previously sampled mode
N (st; m0,CzR) if k is a new mode
(
ð6Þ
where ‘‘new mode’’ refers to the first mode that has never been
active before time i. This completes the description of our
inference algorithm, which we refer to as the Dirichlet process
Kalman filter (DP-KF).
Viewed as a mechanistic psychological model, the DP-KF
assumes that the memory system keeps track of two kinds of traces:
episodic traces encoding the sensory stimulus at each time point
(st), and more general traces that encode summary statistics of
stimuli belonging to a common mode (x^kt ). These summary
statistics are updated in an incremental, psychologically plausible
manner using error-driven learning. Episodes are partitioned into
modes by a competitive clustering process similar to mechanisms
that have been proposed in many other psychological and neural
models [23,24,34,37,38].
Model behavior
Eq. 6 operationalizes the idea that large prediction errors will
lead to the inference of a new mode: For an old mode the
Gaussian log-likelihood is inversely proportional to DDst{xtDD2, the
distance between the current observation and the state when the
mode was last active, where t is the time at which the old mode
last occurred, while for a new mode the log-likelihood is
proportional to DDstDD2 (with the constant of proportionality scaling
these distances by the variances of the modes). Thus when
DDst{xtDD2 is large relative to DDstDD2 the DP-KF will tend to assign
observation t to a new mode, analogous to the process by which
Blumenfeld et al. ’s [22] saliency-weighted learning rule creates a
new attractor when the input pattern fails to match any of the
existing attractors. (Although the likelihood for a new mode
depends on the absolute scale of st, in our simulations this
dependence was very weak, as the variance parameter was set to
c=1000.) Furthermore, because the variance of a mode grows
with the length of time since its last occurrence (Dt{tD), older
modes will be more ‘‘tolerant’’ of prediction errors.
Figure 1A illustrates the results of inference using our model
with a one-dimensional sensory stimulus. Here we assumed
m0~0,r~0:01,q~0:001,w~0:99,b~0 and a=1. The sensory
stimulus changed gradually, then underwent a jump, and then
changed gradually again. On each time point we first inferred the
hidden state based on past observations only (these are the model
predictions). Following that, the sensory measurement was
observed, thereby allowing the computation of its likelihood and
updating of the posterior distribution. As a result, model
predictions lag behind the jump. Nevertheless, due to inferring a
new mode after the jump, the DP-KF (circles) ‘‘catches up’’ with
the sensory evidence after one trial, whereas the regular KF model
(squares) takes much longer. This occurs because the KF smooths
across the jump as all observations are assumed to be generated by
one slowly diffusing mode, whereas the DP-KF achieves piecewise
smoothness by segmenting the time series into two modes, thereby
producing better predictions.
Figure 1B shows the results of applying the DP-KF to the
‘‘gradual’’ and ‘‘mixed’’ experimental protocols described in the
Introduction [15–17,20,21,39]. Here we used a sequence of one-
dimensional measurements morphing between 0 and 1. In the
gradual protocol, the sensory measurement (morphs) increased
monotonically with time, whereas in the mixed protocol the
morphs were presented in scrambled order. To analyze the
simulated data, we re-sorted the indices from the mixed condition
to match the gradual condition and calculated the posterior
probability of mode 1 for each morph. Consistent with the
psychophysical and neurophysiological data [15–17,20,21,39], the
mixed protocol results in morphs being assigned to two different
modes, whereas the gradual protocol results in all the morphs
being predominantly assigned to a single mode.
Note that even if each of the modes is already firmly ingrained
(through extensive experience with the morphs, as was the case in
some of the experimental work we discussed), we still expect to see
gradual or abrupt changes in the posterior probability of mode 1
depending on the morph sequence, since the sensory data are
ambiguous with respect to the underlying dynamical mode. In
other words, the time course of the posterior reflects uncertainty
about which mode is currently active, and this uncertainty may
change smoothly or abruptly depending on the stimulus sequence.
Experiment: Memory for dynamically changing visual
stimuli
We now describe an experiment designed to test a fundamental
prediction of our model: if different modes correspond to different
memories, inference of a new mode should protect the memory for
old observations from retroactive interference due to new
observations (see Materials and Methods for more details).
Figure 2 illustrates the task. We exposed human participants to
sequences of simple visual stimuli (lines) whose orientation and
length changed from trial to trial, and asked them, at the end of
Statistics of Memory Updating
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the sequence, to reconstruct from memory one of the stimuli from
the beginning of the sequence. To ensure that participants were
encoding the stimuli, and to provide data that can be compared to
the model’s trial-by-trial predictions for the purpose of model
fitting, we also asked participants to actively predict the orientation
and length of the next line. Each participant was exposed to
sequences belonging to two conditions: in the ‘‘gradual’’ condition,
the lines changed slowly, through small perturbations in orienta-
tion/length space; in the ‘‘jump’’ condition, this slow change was
interrupted by a large change in the middle of the sequence
(Figure 3). Importantly, we kept the overall distance (in terms of
orientation and length) between the start and end points of each
sequence approximately equal in both conditions.
We reasoned that if participants used prediction errors to
segment their observations into distinct modes, then they would
infer two modes in the jump condition (one for the first half and
one for the second half of the sequence), but only one mode for the
gradual condition. Segmenting the sequence would mean that the
memory for the first half should be less biased by observations in
the second half. We therefore hypothesized that reconstructions of
early lines would be more veridical in the jump condition. By
contrast, in the gradual condition, later observations would have
been assigned to the initial mode, leading to alteration of that
mode. Compared to the jump condition, reconstructions in the
gradual condition should therefore be more similar to lines
observed later in the block, and less similar to the target early lines.
Example trajectories and reconstructions for a single participant
are shown in Figure S1.
To test our hypothesis, for each sequence we calculated the
Euclidean distance between the participant’s reconstruction and
the true line observed at the beginning of the block, as well as the
distance from the line observed at the end of that block. The
results, presented in Figure 4A, show that participants’ recon-
structions were closer to the last line (t~3:83,pv0:001), and
farther from the first line (t~2:1,pv0:05) in the gradual condition
as compared to the jump condition. A two-way (first/last 6
gradual/jump) ANOVA confirmed that the interaction was
significant (F~10:26,pv0:005). We interpret this result as
Figure 1. Simulations. (A) Simulated sensory measurements and inferred state variables. For the DP-KF, the colors indicate the mode assignment
with the highest posterior probability, white circles = mode 1, black circles = mode 2. (B) Posterior probability of mode 1 as a function of morph
index in the gradual and mixed protocols, using the DP-KF (averaged over multiple simulation runs). See text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g001
Figure 2. Experimental task. (Left) Prediction trial: participants were asked to predict the orientation and length of the next line segment
(prediction shown in the center of the screen). At the bottom of the screen, a black circle superimposed on a timeline (the black bar) was used to
indicate the trial’s serial position in the block. At the start of each block, the black circle started out in the leftmost position; after each trial, the circle’s
position shifted one position to the right. (Middle) After making a prediction, participants were shown the true line segment and received a point
score based on their prediction accuracy. (Right) Reconstruction trial: at the end of each block, participants were asked to reconstruct from memory
the line they saw on one of the first three trials (indicated by an arrow on the timeline). No feedback was given for these reconstruction trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g002
Statistics of Memory Updating
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Figure 3. Example trajectories and hypothetical reconstructions. Each circle represents a line segment presented in a sequence, with the
shaded circle indicating the first trial. The dimensions are standardized to a [0,100] range. The blue diamond represents a hypothetical reconstruction
of the line segment indicated by the arrow. In solid black is the distance between the reconstruction and the starting point, while the dashed black
line shows the distance between the reconstruction and the end point. (A) A gradual trajectory. Here we expected the reconstruction to be pulled
away from the start point and towards the end point. (B) A jump trajectory. Here we expected the reconstruction to stay in the vicinity of the pre-
jump points. As a result, we expected the distance between the reconstruction and the start point to be smaller in the jump condition as compared
to the gradual condition, and the distance between the reconstruction and the end point to be smaller in the gradual condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g003
Figure 4. Experimental results and model predictions. (A) Euclidean distance between participants’ reconstructions and the observed (true)
first and last lines in a block. Error bars represent within-subject standard error of the mean. The results show that participants were more accurate in
their reconstructions in the jump condition as compared to the gradual condition. (B) Stationary Kalman filter (KF) model predictions. Data in (A) are
represented by black circles. (C) Non-stationary KF model predictions. (D) Stationary Dirichlet process Kalman filter (DP-KF) model predictions. (E)
Non-stationary DP-KF predictions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g004
Statistics of Memory Updating
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showing that, in the gradual condition, participants inferred one
mode, thereby causing lines from the second half to influence
memory for the lines from the first half; by contrast, in the jump
condition participants inferred separate pre-jump and post-jump
modes, thereby protecting their memory of the pre-jump lines
from being distorted by the post-jump lines.
Model-based analysis of experimental data
Assuming that the individual trace of each stimulus is noisy (see
Materials and Methods), it is reasonable for the memory system to
use information from multiple trials to aid in reconstruction. In
our model, this is accomplished at retrieval by ‘‘smoothing’’ over
(or blurring together) the traces of trials that occurred nearby in
time. This blurring removes noise under the assumption that
stimuli change slowly over time and hence the underlying signal is
temporally autocorrelated (whereas the noise is not). Formally, this
corresponds to a form of Kalman smoothing [40]. However, it is
important to not smooth over instances that are very different
from each other (i.e., across time points where an abrupt jump
occurred and as a result the signal is no longer autocorrelated).
Inference over multiple dynamical modes remedies this problem
by segmenting the time series into parts that are each internally
smooth; our smoothing algorithm operates within but not across
these modes (note that even when there is only a single dynamical
mode, smoothing can still reconstruct individual stimuli, rather
than blurring them all together, because a representation of each
stimulus is available to the retrieval system). A formal description
of this smoothing algorithm is given in the Materials and Methods.
To test how well our proposed model fit participants’ data
throughout the experiment, we fit several variants of the DP-KF and
KF models to participants’ responses on prediction trials (in which
participants had to predict the next version of the line), holding out
the responses on reconstruction trials for validation and comparison
between the models (see Materials and Methods for details of the
model-fitting methods). Four model variants were constructed from
the full model by restricting parameter values as follows:
N Stationary KF: A Kalman filter in which the hidden state is
stationary (qd~0 for all d). This means all variation is
attributed to the sensory and response noise. This model has
five free parameters: w, r1, r2, n1, and n2 (where superscripts 1
and 2 refer to the two stimulus dimensions: length and angle).
The n parameters represent response noise variances (see
Materials and Methods for more details).
Figure 5. Model comparison. (A) Predictive log-likelihood for each model, on prediction trials, relative to the stationary KF model. Larger values
indicate superior performance on held-out data from prediction trials. (B) Predictive log-likelihood for each model, on the reconstruction data, relative
to the stationary KF model. Error bars represent within-subject standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g005
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N KF: A Kalman filter in which the hidden state is allowed to
diffuse over time (q§0). This model has seven free parameters:
w,r1,r2,q1,q2,n1, and n2.
N Stationary DP-KF: In this model, the hidden state can be
drawn from multiple modes, where each mode’s hidden state is
stationary in time (qd~0 for all d). Modes tend to persist over
time with the strength of persistence determined by b§0. This
model thus has seven free parameters: w,r1,r2,n1,n2, a and b.
N DP-KF: This is the full Dirichlet process Kalman filter model.
It allows multiple diffusing modes that each can change over
time (qd§0). This model has nine free parameters:
w,r1,r2,n1,n2, q1,q2, a and b.
Figure 4B-E shows the predicted reconstruction biases for each
of these models. Unlike our participants, neither the KF models
nor the stationary DP-KF model showed a cross-over interaction
between jump/gradual and start/end. In contrast, the DP-KF
model showed a cross-over interaction effect
(F~42:23,pv0:0001). Thus among the four alternatives, only
the DP-KF model adequately captured the experimental results.
We quantitatively compared the fits of the different models in
two ways. First, we performed cross-validation by splitting the
blocks into two halves (even- and odd-numbered blocks), fitting the
model to the trial-by-trial prediction data for one half of the blocks
and computing the predictive log-likelihood of data for the other
half of the blocks. Figure 5A shows the predictive log-likelihood of
each model relative to the stationary KF model. The KF and DP-
KF models performed similarly (a paired-sample t-test revealed no
significant difference, p~0:8), and significantly better than their
stationary variants (pv0:0001).
Our second model-comparison metric was the predictive log-
likelihood of participants’ reconstructions. Note that the models
were not fit to the reconstruction data, so there is no need to
penalize for model complexity: overfitting the prediction-trials
data due to too many degrees of freedom will automatically lead to
poorer results when trying to predict the reconstruction trials.
Figure 5B shows the predictive log-likelihood of each model
relative to the stationary KF. According to this measure, the DP-
KF model outperformed both the KF variants (pv0:05) and
performed marginally better than the stationary DP-KF (p~0:07).
To illustrate the DP-KF model’s accuracy in predicting recon-
structions, we computed the Pearson correlation coefficient
between the human and model reconstructions for each partic-
ipant separately, Fisher z-transformed this value, and performed a
t-test against 0 for all participants. Correlations for both
orientation and length were significant (each pv0:001, two-tailed
t-test; Figure 6).
Finally, in keeping with our theoretical predictions, we found
that the number of modes (K) inferred by the fitted DP-KF model
was, on average, higher in the jump condition than in the gradual
condition (t~12:27,pv0:0001; Figure 7).
Discussion
We addressed, both theoretically and experimentally, a basic
question about memory: When does new experience cause an
existing memory to be modified versus a new memory to be
formed? Our answer took the form of a rational analysis [10]. In
particular, we proposed that the structure of memories reflects a
process of optimal filtering in a dynamically changing environ-
ment, where each memory encodes a distinct ‘‘dynamical mode’’
Figure 6. Comparison of model and human reconstructions. Histogram of z-transformed correlations between human reconstructions and
model reconstructions for (A) the orientation dimension and (B) the length dimension. Vertical black line indicates a correlation of 0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g006
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of the environment. New modes are inferred when there are
abrupt discontinuities in the temporal dynamics of sensory data
that cannot be explained by existing memories. Such discontinu-
ities are typically accompanied by a large prediction error,
suggesting a biologically plausible mechanism for implementing
memory-trace formation: The brain may split off new memory
traces when large prediction errors are registered [23–25,41].
Prediction errors are believed to be computed in many areas of the
brain, including area CA1 of the hippocampus [42] and midbrain
dopaminergic nuclei [43]. Indeed, predictive coding theories
propose that prediction errors are computed throughout the
neocortex [44].
Importantly, the specific model used here belongs to a large
family of statistical models that instantiate the idea that abrupt,
inexplicable changes in the environment result in inference of a
new mode [28]. The main contribution of this paper is to provide
an experimental test of this principle in the domain of human
reconstructive memory. In our experiment, participants were
asked to reconstruct from memory a previously encountered visual
stimulus, under conditions where the stimulus had since changed
over time either gradually or abruptly. We envision inference over
dynamic modes of the environment as giving rise to temporally
extended episodic memory traces that group together individual
stimulus traces, thus causing some generalization or interference
between the memories of different specific observations. We thus
measured the degree to which later stimuli modify the memory of
earlier instances by assessing the extent to which the reconstructed
stimulus shifted from the starting point of the stimulus trajectory
towards the end point. We showed that gradual change resulted in
greater memory modification than abrupt change, in agreement
with our theoretical prediction that gradual change would favor
inference of a single dynamical mode that would incorporate all
stimuli in a block, whereas abrupt change would favor the
inference of multiple modes, each relatively untainted by
experience that is associated with the other mode.
The behavioral effect that we showed cannot be explained by
recency or primacy biases: A recency bias does not predict a
difference between the conditions, because the conditions were
matched for total distance traveled and for trial-to-trial differences
in the stimuli in all trials but the jump trial (which was always in
the middle of the sequence). Therefore, stimuli at the end of a
block, just prior to the reconstruction trial, were (on average)
equally similar to the initial stimulus across conditions. Likewise, a
primacy bias does not predict a difference between conditions,
since the stimuli in the beginning of the block did not differ
systematically between conditions.
The choice between modifying an existing memory versus
creating a new one is formalized in our model using a
nonparametric prior over partitions known as the Chinese
restaurant process [33] (see [31] for an explanation of the Chinese
restaurant metaphor and its origins). This prior has previously
been used to model category formation [34,35], Pavlovian
conditioning in multiple contexts [24,45], word segmentation
[46] and task-set learning [47] (for a review of this literature, see
[48]). All of these domains have in common the problem of
segmenting stimuli and actions into coherent clusters (or, in our
case, modes). The Chinese restaurant process is a natural prior for
segmentation because it allows an unbounded number of clusters
while preferring fewer clusters. This prior thus expresses a bias
towards simplicity [32]. Even without such a prior bias, simpler
segmentations are naturally favored by Bayesian inference due to
the ‘‘automatic Occam’s razor’’ phenomenon [49], whereby
simpler explanations of data have higher marginal likelihood than
more complex explanations. While the experiment we report does
not directly address whether humans exhibit a simplicity bias in
memory formation, this question has been addressed by other
work from our laboratory [50].
One limitation of the current study is that it did not test a
further prediction of our model: When a change occurs, an old
mode can be reinvoked, rather than creating a new mode. Thus
our findings could potentially be explained by a model that creates
a new mode every time a large change is observed (although
previous modes would still have to be maintained in memory to
allow recall, unlike some models, e.g., [11]). In future work, we will
Figure 7. Model-based analysis. Number of modes (K) inferred by the DP-KF model for each condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003939.g007
Statistics of Memory Updating
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 9 November 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 11 | e1003939
test the hypothesis that old modes can be modified in this
paradigm. Using a perceptual estimation paradigm [50] we have
shown that participants can update two modes in an alternating
fashion, if these are signaled externally (in that case, by the color of
the stimuli). However, unlike our current study, this earlier study
did not manipulate the dynamics of stimulus trajectories and so
could not address the dynamics of memory formation as a result of
(abrupt vs. gradual) change in the environment.
Related work
Several authors have proposed neural implementations of the
KF [51,52]. Wilson and Finkel [52] derived an approximation of
the KF that can be computed by a recurrent neural network when
the prediction error is small. Intriguingly, when the prediction
error is large, their approximation ‘breaks down’ by creating two
bumps in the posterior distribution (rather than one as in the exact
KF) with each bump implementing an independent KF. Our
theory suggests a normative account of this feature, since a
network that creates multiple bumps is precisely what is required
by the DP-KF algorithm. Pursuing this connection is an exciting
direction for future research.
Work on change detection [11,53–59] addresses a similar
question: how does the brain detect a change in the statistics of
sensory signals? The study of Nassar et al. [56], for example,
showed that humans use the recent history of prediction errors to
determine when a change has occurred. This work differs from our
own in several ways. First, most existing change-detection theories
assume stationary sensory statistics between jumps, whereas we
allow for gradual change between jumps. Second, once a jump has
occurred, theories of change detection assume that the statistics of
earlier epochs are no longer relevant and can be discarded; in
contrast, our model assumes that participants are able to retrieve
statistics from earlier modes, and in general allows for the
environment to return to earlier modes (as noted above, our
current experiment did not test this latter property of the model).
Our work also intersects with research in cognitive psychology on
the reuse of existing memory traces. For example, repeating items on
a list tends to aid their recognition without degrading recognition of
other items (the null list-strength effect [60]). To explain this, Shiffrin
et al. [8] assumed that repetition of items results in refinement of
existing traces, rather than formation of new traces. Thus, there must
be some reuse of memory traces. The question, then, is what counts
as a repetition. Visually similar stimuli such as those used in our
experiment may be judged by the memory system to be essentially
the same item (i.e., a ‘‘repetition’’). Our theory further asserts that
small changes in these ‘‘repetitions’’ drive modification of existing
memories, but not formation of new memories. This is similar to
what Bower and Winzenz [7] dubbed the ‘‘reallocation hypothesis,’’
according to which inputs are matched to memory traces and
incorporated into an existing trace if the match is sufficiently high;
otherwise, the input is routed to a new trace (see also [9]).
Interestingly, evidence suggests that failure to recognize a new
context can sometimes lead to neither outcome: using an auditory
statistical learning paradigm, Gebhart et al. [61] found that changes
in structural information can go undetected without the aid of
additional cues (e.g., sounds marking the transition between
structures), preventing participants from learning new structures.
This suggests that future models should incorporate a mechanism
that allows some information to evade both old and new memories.
The dynamically updated posterior posited by our model bears
some resemblance to the drifting context vector posited by several
models in the memory literature [62,63]. For example, the
Temporal Context Model (TCM) introduced by Howard and
Kahana [63] assumes that list items are bound to a context vector
that is essentially an average of recently experienced items. In
earlier work [64], we operationalized the context vector as a
posterior over latent ‘‘topics’’ that play the same role as modes in
the present paper. In our current theory, items are bound to
modes in much the same way that items are bound to the context
vector in TCM. The connection to TCM also highlights the way
in which episodic and semantic memory are deeply intertwined in
contemporary theories: ‘‘episodic’’ traces of individual items
become bound to ‘‘semantic’’ representations that average over
multiple items [65]. Likewise in our model, episodic and semantic
components are intertwined: a separate trace for each sensory
stimulus is stored, but the traces are effectively blurred together by
the smoothing operation during retrieval. Although the idea of
separate episodic and semantic memory systems has been very
influential [13], it has been known since Bartlett’s investigations
[66] that semantic knowledge exerts strong constraints on many
aspects of episodic memory [67,68]. A similar rapprochement has
emerged in theories of category learning, where ‘‘episodic’’
(exemplar) and ‘‘semantic’’ (prototype) representations are com-
bined to form varying levels of abstraction [35,69,70].
Another related line of work concerns the effects of novelty on
memory. Our model predicts that a novel stimulus is more likely to
be encoded in a separate trace compared to a familiar stimulus,
making it less likely that the novel stimulus will suffer interference
from other stimuli at retrieval. This prediction has been confirmed
many times in the form of the von Restorff effect [71]. Note that
while the von Restorff effect reflects proactive interference (older
memories interfering with the retrieval of newer memories) and our
experiment tested retroactive interference (newer memories inter-
fering with the retrieval of older memories), according to our model
these are essentially due to the same process of grouping of different
observations into temporally extended episodic memory traces.
The idea of comparing gradual and abrupt changes as a means
of influencing memory updating has also been explored in the
motor control literature [72–74]. For example, Kagerer et al. [72]
had participants make arm movements to a target and then
introduced a perturbation (by rotating the visual feedback) either
gradually or abruptly. Participants adapted to the perturbation;
following the removal of the perturbation, participants exhibited
an after-effect in which movement errors were in the direction
opposite to the perturbation. Kagerer et al. found that the after-
effect was smaller for participants in the abrupt condition than in
the gradual condition. This pattern of results is consistent with the
idea that two separate motor memories were formed in the abrupt
condition, thereby allowing the pre-perturbation memory to be
reinstated quickly. The larger after-effect in the gradual condition
suggests that in that case the gradual perturbation led to
modification of the original memory. Such modifications can be
long-lasting: Yamamoto et al. [75] have shown that learning a
gradually changing motor task produces a motor memory that can
be recovered over a year later.
Finally, we have recently reported related findings in the
domain of Pavlovian fear conditioning [41]. Rats learned to
associate a tone with a foot-shock. Subsequently, one group of rats
were presented with the tone in the absence of shock (standard
‘extinction’ of the tone-shock association). A second group of rats
experienced the same number of tones, with the the tone-shock
contingency only gradually reduced to zero (that is, to full
extinction). Although all rats showed similarly diminished fear of
the tone at the end of the ‘extinction’ phase, rats in the standard
extinction condition exhibited subsequent recovery of fear (as is
typically seen after extinction training), whereas rats in the gradual
condition showed no evidence of fear recovery. These findings are
consistent with the idea that the fear memory is more likely to be
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modified by extinction training in the gradual condition, thereby
reducing the probability of later recovery.
Conclusions
In this paper, we empirically investigated a fundamental
prediction that models of change detection make for memory. If,
as we hypothesize, new experience is incorporated into old
memories based on similarity, then abrupt change (i.e., dissimilar
data) should prompt the creation of a new memory trace, and thus
protect old memories from being modified by new data, whereas
gradual change will not. Our experimental results confirm this
prediction, thereby providing support for a statistical account of
how continuous experience is parsed into discrete memory traces.
We conclude that memories are not simply a record of our
ongoing experiences; the organization of memory traces reflects
our subjective inferences about the structure of the world that
surrounds us.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Princeton University.
Participants
32 undergraduate students received course credit or payment
($12 per hour) for participating in the experiment. The experiment
was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Princeton
University.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of oriented line segments that changed in
orientation and length on every trial. Each line segment was
generated from the previous one by (randomly) adding or
subtracting a fixed length (0.89 mm) and a fixed angle (14.4u),
thus generating a 45u ‘move’ in an orientation/length space in
which one unit was 14.4u and 0.89 mm, respectively. ‘Moves’ were
restricted so that the new line segment did not overlap with the
previous line segment (that is, there was no ‘backtracking’ in
orientation/length space; see Figure 3). Jumps were also at a 45u
angle, but traversed a distance 4 times as long as the other steps
(i.e., 3.6 mm length and 57.6u angle). Jumps always occurred (if
they did) in the middle of the trajectory (between trials 9 and 10),
and were unsignaled to the participant. Finally, in generating
trajectories through orientation/length space, we required the
Euclidean distance between the start and end points to lie within a
narrow range (60–70% of the maximum possible distance)
regardless of the condition (jump or gradual). Examples of jump
and gradual trajectories are shown in Figure 3.
Procedure
Participants played 12 blocks of the task (6 jump trajectories
and 6 gradual trajectories, randomly interleaved). Each block
consisted of a sequence of 18 prediction trials. A timeline showed
participants the serial position of each trial in a block. On each
prediction trial, participants used a mouse to adjust the
orientation and length of a line on the screen so as to predict
the next observed line. After making their prediction, participants
were shown the true line and awarded points based on how
accurate their prediction was. The prediction task was aimed at
encouraging encoding of the different line segments in memory,
and also provided data for fitting our models (see below). At the
end of the block, participants were given a reconstruction trial; on
this trial, they were shown an arrow pointing toward a point on
the timeline and asked to reconstruct the line segment they saw
on that trial. Participants were always asked to reconstruct one of
the first 3 trials in the block. No feedback was given on
reconstruction trials.
Reconstruction by smoothing
Let xkt denote the estimated stimulus for time t given all
observations up to the time of retrieval conditional on zt~k.
Kalman smoothing [40] constructs this estimate through a
backward recursion:
xkdt ~x^
kd
t zw
lkdt
lkdtz1
(xkdtz1{x^
kd
tz1) ð7Þ
for each dimension d. In essence, smoothing combines the
filtered estimate x^kdt with information from the future propagated
backward in time. We take xkt to be the model’s prediction for a
participant’s reconstruction of the stimulus shown at time t.
Model-fitting
Prior to model-fitting, the stimulus values (length and orienta-
tion) were rescaled to [0, 100]. To model responses, we assumed
that participants report the posterior mean, corrupted by
anisotropic Gaussian noise (with variances n1 and n2, for length
and orientation, respectively. Depending on the model variant, the
noise variance r, the response noise variance v, the diffusion noise
variance q, the stickiness parameter b and the concentration
parameter a were treated as free parameters and fit to each
participant’s data by minimizing the negative log-likelihood of
each participant’s predictions using a numerical optimizer (the
routine fmincon in Matlab), while constraining parameters to lie in
the appropriate range. To prevent implausibly large values of v, q
and r, we constrained these to be less than 10, 30 and 20,
respectively, although our results do not depend on these precise
values. To avoid local minima, the optimization was run from 3
randomly chosen starting points. We assumed that responses were
generated from the filtered state estimate (or smoothed state
estimate, in the case of retrieval), corrupted by Gaussian noise with
anisotropic noise variance (n1 and n2). For the KF model, a was set
to 0. We set the prior covariances to be cd~1000, instantiating an
approximately uniform distribution over mode starting points.
Reconstruction trials were not used in any of the fitting
procedures. To model noise in the reconstruction process, we
added a constant of 5 to the sensory noise variance (rd). This value
was chosen by hand, but the results were not sensitive to its precise
value.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Example trajectories and reconstructions for
a single participant. The top row shows trajectories in the
‘‘gradual’’ condition. The bottom row shows trajectories in the
‘‘jump’’ condition. The first trial is indicated by the large circle,
and the blue diamond shows the reconstruction.
(EPS)
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